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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR
COMPUTER PROGRAMS: ARE PATENTS
NOW OBTAINABLE?
The proper form of intellectual property protection to be given computer
software1 has been the subject of frequent judicial and administrative inquiry
as the computer industry has grown during the past quarter century. 2 Protec-
tion of the software developer's investment, public access to the developed
software, and technological progress within the computer industry have long
been recognized as the theoretical goals of any scheme of software protection
under the law. Nevertheless, there has been substantial disagreement as to
the proper means to accomplish these agreed upon ends. 3  The extent to
which computer software can be protected under the intellectual property
concepts of trade secret law and the law of copyrights is known, 4 the un-
resolved question is the scope of computer software protection under the
patent laws.
Trade secret law, the copyright laws, and the patent laws require differ-
ing degrees of novelty5 and compliance with certain procedures before prop-
1. A computing system is generally considered to have two basic types of com-
ponents: "hardware" and "software." Hardware refers to the physical architecture of
the computer; software refers to both the computer programs and the instructions which
control the functions of the hardware. See generally Computer Programs: Should They
Be Patentable?, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 241 (1968).
2. See, e.g., Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63 (1972); In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997 (C.C.P.A. 1972); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d
882 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Prater,
415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A.
1969); Guidelines to Examination of Applications for Patents on Computer Programs,
855 OFFICIAL GAZETrE OF THE U.S. PAT. OFF. 829 (1968); REPORT OF THE PRESmENT'S
COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM (1966), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 13 (1967).
3. See 68 COLUM. L. REV. 241, supra note 1; Comment, Computer Program Protec-
tion: The Need to Legislate a Solution, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 586 (1969); Comment,
Computer Program Classification: A Limitation on Program Patentability as a Process,
53 ORE. L. REV. 501 (1974); Note, Protecting Proprietary Rights of Computer Pro-
grams: The Need for New Legislative Protection, 21 CATH. U.L. REV. 181 (1971);
Note, Protection of Computer Programs: Resurrection of the Standard, 50 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 333 (1974).
4. See 54 CORNELL L. REV., supra note 3, at 589-90.
5. For a discussion of the novelty requirement in trade secret law, see R. MILuM,
TRADE SECRETS § 2.08 (11th ed. 1977). The novelty requirements under the copyright
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erty will be given protection against wrongful appropriation or infringe-
ment. The patent statutes also mandate that the property or invention
possess the attributes of one of a limited number of classes of patentable sub-
ject matter. If the invention is a "new and useful process, machine, manu-
facture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof," then the invention may be patented subject to the other require-
ments of the statute. 6  If, however, the invention is a method of doing
business,7 an algorithm,8 a mere idea,9 or a discovery of a phenomenon of
nature, 10 it is not properly a subject for patent protection."
The requirement that a patentable invention be within a statutory classifi-
cation forms the basis of a continuing dispute over the patentability of inven-
tions in computer software, or, as they are more commonly known, computer
programs. Computers themselves are patentable as "machines." Since they
represent the use of a computer to perform a specified function or solve a
problem, computer programs are, however, not so easily characterized as
patentable subject matter, such as a process or a machine. Programs have
been considered to fall under the categories of algorithm, method of doing
business, or other unpatentable subject matter.' 2 The often differing opin-
ions of the courts, Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) officials, and patent
and patent statutes are set forth at 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 (Supp. App. 1977) and 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102-03 (1970 & Supp.) respectively.
6. The classes of statutory subject matter are set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970):
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."
7. Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 1908)
(hotel bookkeeping and registration system not limited to any particular method or
apparatus held unpatentable).
8. Guthrie v. Curlett, 10 F.2d 725, 726 (2d Cir. 1926) (valid patent cannot issue
if no patentable means are disclosed for implementing the new idea).
9. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972); Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard,
87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874).
10. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 120 (1853) (claim to the effects of the use of
magnetism held invalid).
11. For a discussion of non-statutory subject matter, see I A. DELLER, DELLER'S
WALKER ON PATENTS § 22 (2d ed. 1964).
12. The term "program" is defined alternatively in C.J. SIPPL & C.P. SIPPL, COM-
PUTER DICTIONARY AND HANDBOOK 339 (2d ed. 1972) as:
1. A plan for the automatic solution of a problem. A complete program in-
cludes plans for the transcription of data, coding for the computer, and
plans for the absorption of the result into the system. The list of coded
instructions is called a routine.
2. A set of instructions or steps that tells the computer exactly how to handle
a complete problem-payroll, production scheduling, or other applications.
[Vol. 26:835
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applicants as to what constitutes a patentable computer program have re-
sulted in frequent litigation and many unresolved questions.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) in the recent decision
of In re Chatfield13 has rekindled optimism in the theory that patent protec-
tion is appropriate for computer software inventions. The court laid to rest
the notion that inventions are unpatentable merely because they are most ad-
vantageously embodied in a computer program. The inventive use of a com-
puter was recognized as a field of technology legitimately promoted by the
patent system.
14
The court in Chatfield addressed the patentability of an invention in which
the preferred embodiment was a computer program. The PTO Board of
Appeals had held the invention unpatentable because it was directed to com-
puter software and was ipso facto nonstatutory subject matter.15 The CCPA
refused to adopt such a broad rule and indicated that the issue of patentabil-
ity in this and similar cases could be resolved only by subjecting the claimed
invention as a whole to the tests of patentability. 16  Viewed in this light, a
majority of the court found for the applicant and held that it is no bar to
patentability that an invention is most advantageously implemented by means
of a computer program. 7 In Chatfield, the CCPA merged their knowledge
of computer technology with their expertise in patent law to formulate
standards to aid PTO officials in identifying statutory subject matter in the
computer software context.' 8
13. 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3181 (U.S. Oct. 4,
1977).
14. The constitutional basis for the patent system is found in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8: "The Congress shall have power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
15. 545 F.2d at 155.
16. Id. at 157.
17. Id. at 158-59.
18. On the same day that Chatfield was announced, the CCPA decided the case of
In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3181 (U.S. Oct.
4, 1977). The claims in Noll involved a programmed computer-controlled apparatus
for displaying characters and graphical information on a cathode ray tube. The PTO
Board of Appeals rejected the claims as a non-statutory apparatus and, in effect, an
attempt to obtain a patent on the program for controlling the apparatus. Id. at 147-49.
The CCPA reversed. The timing of the decisions in Noll and Chatfield appear to
indicate a deliberate choice by the CCPA to issue holdings in a process and an apparatus
case relating to computer programs. See COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 3, 1977, at 14, col. 3.
On July 5, 1977 Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., the assignee of the Noll patent ap-
plication, filed an express abandonment of the application. On July 7, 1977 Bell filed
a memorandum which requested that the judgment below be vacated and the case
remanded to the C.C.P.A. for dismissal. Memorandum of Respondent suggesting the
cause is moot (U.S. July 7, 1977) (No. 76-1558). Thus, although the CCPA's decision
1977]
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This article will examine the scope of protection for computer software in-
ventions afforded under the intellectual property concepts of trade secret law
and copyright law, and consider the ramifications of the Chatfield decision
on the field of patent protection for this type of invention.
I. COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROTECTION UNDER
TRADE SECRET AND COPYRIGHT LAW
Both state common law and statutory law afford protection for trade
secrets.19 This protection originally evolved from the law of unfair competi-
tion, 20 and it now embraces processes, machines, or compilations of informa-
tion which provide the owner with advantages over competitors who neither
know nor use the object of the trade secret. 21 To qualify as a trade secret,
the process, machine, or compilation of information must not be commonly
known.2 2  Trade secret protection can extend to subject matter excluded
from patent protection either for lack of patentable novelty or failure to be
statutory subject matter under the patent laws. 23  Therefore, an owner of a
computer software invention can protect his investment in unpatentable com-
puter software by meeting the minimal trade secret requirements. A trade
secret can be kept secret by the owner or disclosed to others such as licen-
sees who in turn must be required to maintain the secret. 24  Furthermore,
trade secret law protects the owner in perpetuity from any fraudulent mis-
appropriation 25 and this relatively extensive protection has induced large
capital investments in software inventions.
There are disadvantages to both the owner and the public, however, in
the use of trade secret protection. The scope of protection is limited since
the owner is unprotected from subsequent independent discovery by another,
discovery of the secret by reverse engineering,26 or public discovery by acci-
in Noll indicated that apparatus claims relating to computer programs could be patent-
able, the Noll decision is now of little significance since it will most likely be vacated.
19. See MILGRIM, supra note 5, §§ 1.09, 1.10. App. § 2.01(1) sets forth the Uniform
Trade Secrets Protection Act proposed by the ABA Patent, Trademark and Copyright
Law Section in 1971.
20. D. Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 909, 930-
31 (1970).
21. See MILGRIM, supra note 5, § 2.01.
22. Id. §§ 2.03, 2.07.
23. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (state trade secret
protection is not preempted by federal patent law).
24. See MILGRIM, supra note 5, § 3.05(5).
25. See 21 CATH. U.L. REV., supra note 3, at 195.
26. The term "reverse engineering" refers to discovering the secret materials, features
or processes employed in producing the product by lawfully acquiring the product and
then disassembling it into its component parts.
[Vol. 26:835
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dental or mistaken disclosure. 27 Thus there is the risk that the owner will
lose exclusive rights in the secret property. 28 Also, there is judicial hostility
to recognizing a monopoly, albeit not a patent monopoly, for an invention
which fails to rise to the standards of patentability.
In addition to the disadvantages to the owner, a serious public detriment
inheres in the nondisclosure of a trade secret. The requirement of an en-
abling disclosure of a patented invention serves to increase the technological
knowledge possessed by the general public by providing access to the dis-
closed technology and thereby giving incentive to other inventors to invent
around the issued patent and accomplish the same result by noninfringing
means. 29 Moreover, a patented invention becomes available for the use of
the general public after the passage of the specified statutory monopoly,
whereas trade secret protection may last forever. Since trade secret protec-
tion by definition permits no such public disclosure, there is no increase in
knowledge, and duplication of effort and expense can frequently result from
multiple inventors simultaneously working in the same area of technology in
secret.
A viable alternative to trade secret or patent protection for the owner of
a computer software invention is the Copyright Act.3 0 Copyright protection
presents advantages over other forms of intellectual property protection. To
qualify, one must merely establish authenticity of authorship and originality
of expression and fulfill minimal procedural requirements, such as publication
of the work with a notice of ownership.3 1 Copyrights are inexpensive to ob-
tain, may be registered in a short time period, and are effective for the term
of the life of the copyright holder plus 50 years.3 2 Additionally, a holder
is entitled to recover statutory damages from an infringer without a showing
of actual damage.
33
Copyright protection, however, extends only to the form of the expression
27. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
28. Id. at 482.
29. Cf. id. at 481.
30. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-533, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (to be codified
in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.).
31. The Copyright Office in 1964 gave public notice that it would accept computer
software or programs for registration. See U.S. Copyright Office, Announcement SML-
47 (May 19, 1964). The conditions for registration set forth in this Announcement in-
cluded: (1) the computer program must be original, (2) it must have been published
in printed form, and (3) the copies deposited for registration must include reproductions
of the work in human language form as opposed to machine language form.
32. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (to be
codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.).
33. Id. § 504.
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and not to any underlying ideas.3 4 Therefore, the inventive concepts under-
lying a copyrighted computer program can be appropriated with impunity as
long as the structure or coding of the work is not knowingly duplicated. The
owner of a software invention may find this limitation intolerable since the
cost of the actual expression, the program listing to be registered, is most
likely incidental to the overall expense of conceiving and implementing an
inventive use of a computer. Copyright protection is further limited because
a holder has no rights against one who independently duplicates the copy-
righted work.
Another disadvantage to using the copyright in this situation is that despite
public dissemination of a copyrighted work, the public may still be unaware
of the nature and significance of the invention disclosed. Obtaining a copy
of a program listing does not insure that the underlying invention can be suc-
cessfully implemented or that alternative noninfringing methods for practicing
the invention will become apparent to others. Thus, any increase in techno-
logical information and expertise available to the public may be insignifi-
cant.3 -
II. PATENT PROTECTION
The patent system is premised on the quid pro quo exchange of a limited
term monopoly granted to the patentee for public disclosure of the invention.
The invention must encompass statutory subject matter, 36 be novel, 37 nonob-
vious in view of the existing state of the art in the field of the invention,38
and be sufficiently disclosed to enable one skilled in the subject matter of
the invention to practice the invention.3 9  A patent endows the owner with
the right to exclude all others from making, using, or vending the patented
invention for seventeen years.40  Patent protection is enhanced under the
doctrine of equivalents which broadens the scope of the monopoly to include
inventions consisting of slightly different elements. 41 The right to exclude
34. The Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) drew a distinction
between copyright and patent protection when it stated: "Unlike a patent, a copyright
gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression
of the idea-not the idea itself." Id. at 217.
35. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of both copyright and trade
secret protection, see generally 68 COLUM. L. REv., supra note 1; 21 CAT. U.L. REV.,
supra note 3; 54 CORNELL L. REv., supra note 3.
36. 35 U.S.C. § l01 (1970).
37. Id. § 102.
38. Id. § 103.
39. Id. § 112.
40. Id. § 154.
41. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1970) states:
[Vol. 26:835
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and the ability to protect more than the mere expression of an invention are
strong incentives for seeking protection under the patent laws.
To specify the scope of the patent monopoly, the invention disclosure must
include one or more claims which define the invention. 42  The claimed in-
vention may encompass multiple embodiments not all of which would neces-
sarily fall within one of the classes of patentable subject matter set forth in
section 101 of the patent laws.43  Patent applications involving computer
software inventions have most commonly been claimed as either a machine
or a process. 44  The theory underlying machine claims, commonly referred
to as apparatus claims, is that the combination of a general purpose digital
computer and a computer program results in a new, special purpose ap-
paratus with the capability of performing the objects of the program.
45
On the other hand, a "process" within the patent law was defined by the
Supreme Court in Cochrane v. Deener46 as "a mode of treatment of certain
materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or series of acts, performed
upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state
or thing."'47 A program claimed as an inventive process sets forth sequential
steps performable by a computer to manipulate and transform a predefined
set of inputs and variables to produce given results. A computer program
which is claimed as a process affords a broad patent monopoly, as does any
process claim, since the process need not be tied to any particular appara-
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step
for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material,
or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the cor-
responding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof. (emphasis added)
The doctrine of equivalents expands the scope of the patent monopoly defined in the
claims by viewing as a matter of law the recited elements in the claim to include all
reasonable substitutes therefor. Thus a patentee who claims an element A will still
have rights against one who substitutes element B for element A if the claimed combina-
tion with element B operates in substantially the same way in performing a substantially
identical function to obtain a substantially similar result. See Sanitary Refrigerator Co.
v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 41-43 (1929) and Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125-
26 (1877) for pre-codification holdings on the doctrine of equivalents.
42. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1970). "Claims tell what the invention is; they define it.
They are statutory requirements, prescribed for the purpose of making an inventor define
precisely what his invention comprises. Their function is not to add knowledge; it is
to define the scope of a patent grant." 5 A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS
§ 445 (2d ed. 1972) (footnotes omitted).
43. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
44. See note 6 supra for the statutory basis for such claims.
45. See In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Prater, 415 F.2d
1393, 1403 n.29 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
46. 94 U.S. 780 (1876).
47. Id. at 788.
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tus.48  Infringement of a process claim is not avoided by merely reversing
the order of the process steps,49 employing the process to solve a different
problem,50 or by adding steps to the process as claimed.
51
It was the early administrative policy of the PTO, however, that computer
programs claimed as either an apparatus or a process were unpatentable.
52
Uncertainty as to the statutory nature of computer programs, satisfactory
creation of computer programs absent patent protection, and manpower and
facility limitations in the Patent Office were cited to support this policy.
53
This announced predisposition against patenting computer programs did not
completely deter inventors from applying for patents on their software inven-
tions. Initial attempts to obtain process patent protection for computer pro-
grams were rejected by the PTO as nonstatutory subject matter under the
mental steps doctrine. This doctrine, established in the noncomputer case
of In re Abrams,54 consists of a three-pronged test: (1) a method or process
claim in which all the steps are purely mental is not patentable, (2) a method
claim including both mental and physical steps is also not patentable if the
claimed novelty resides in the purely mental steps, and (3) a method claim
including both mental and physical steps is patentable if the point of novelty
resides in steps not purely mental and the mental steps are incidental to the
process. 55 The CCPA finally encountered a PTO mental steps rejection in
the computer-related case of In re Prater5 6 In Prater, the court restricted
the mental steps doctrine and held that the so-called "rules" of Abrams
were inapplicable to a particular process invention which was most ad-
vantageously practiced by a computer program.57 The invention as defined
by the claims was found to be within the industrial arts, to require no
48. See Waxham v. Smith, 294 U.S. 20, 23 (1935); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S.
707, 730 (1881).
49. See Aurora Mantel & Lamp Co. v. Kaufmann, 243 F. 911, 916 (7th Cir. 1917).
50. United States Mitis Co. v. Midvale Steel Co., 135 F. 103, 112 (E.D. Pa. 1904).
51. Miami Copper Co. v. Minerals Separation Ltd., 244 F. 752, 768 (3d Cir. 1917).
52. Patent Office Examination of Patent Applications on Computer Programs,
Notice of Issuance of Guidelines, 33 Fed. Reg. 15609-10 (1968).
53. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 21. The report recom-
mended that computer programs claimed either as an apparatus or as a method be de-
clared unpatentable as nonstatutory subject matter. See 68 COLUM. L. REV. 241, supra
note 1, at 241 n.5.
54. 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).
55. These rules were proposed in the brief for appellant/applicant. Id. at 166.
56. 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), aff'd in part & rev'd in part, 415 F.2d 1393
(C.C.P.A. 1969).
57. In distinguishing Abrams the court noted: "[Imn Abrams, unlike the present situ-
ation the claimed process could only be performed in the mind . . . . The Abrams
situation may thus be distinguished from that presently before us, in which there is ade-
quate disclosure how the process can be performed without mental calculation." 415
F.2d at 1389; see id. at 1402.
[Vol. 26:835
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human mental activity, and thus was patentable.5 8 The court reaffirmed this
distinction in the process program case of In re Bernhart,5 9 noting the
differing capacities of the computer and the human mind, and thereby
further limiting the scope of the mental steps exception.6" Finally, in
In re Musgrave6' the court disaffirmed any support for the mental steps
doctrine noting that all that is necessary to deem "a sequence of operational
steps a statutory 'process' . . . is that it be in the technological arts so as
to be in consonance with the Constitutional purpose to promote the progress
of the 'useful arts.' ",62 Thus the mental steps exclusion had evolved from
the three-pronged Abrams test to an ephemeral requirement that the process
as claimed be native to technological arts, as opposed to liberal or fine
arts.
Frequently the cases developing the law governing process patents for com-
puter programs also contained apparatus claims. In the rehearing of In re
Prater,6 3 the court noted that "[i]n one sense, a general-purpose digital com-
puter may be regarded as but a storeroom of parts and/or electrical com-
ponents."' 64  The introduction of a program into the computer was con-
sidered, in effect, an assembling of these parts into a previously non-existent
special purpose apparatus. The court felt that no human with pencil and
paper could, through mental processes, be the equivalent of such an ap-
paratus, and, therefore, the mental steps doctrine could not be applied to re-
58. Id. at 1389. The court stated that "patent protection . . . is not precluded by the
mere fact that the process could alternatively be carried out by mental steps." Id. This
marks a significant departure from the Abrams ruling that if the invention resided in
a purely mental step the invention is nonstatutory.
59. 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
60. The court noted that a mental steps rejection does not apply where a programmed
computer is claimed in such a manner as not to be equivalent to the human mind.
Id. at 1399. A representative claim was for:
A plotting method. . . comprising:
(a) a first step of programming the computer to compute the position of
planar Cartesian coordinate axes in the given plane relative to the given
set of object points,
(b) a second step of programming the computer to compute and produce an
output defining in sequence the coordinates of the projection of each given
point on the plane with reference to the Cartesian coordinate axes, and
(c) the step of applying the computer output to the input of a planar plotting
apparatus adapted to provide on a plane a succession of straightline seg-
ments that connect between sequential points having positions correspond-
ing to the coordinates computed by the second step.
Id. at 1397.
61. 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
62. Id. at 893.
63. 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
64. Id. at 1403 n.29.
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ject a computer-related invention claimed as an apparatus and embodied in
a computer program. This concept was affirmed in In re Bernhart65 where
the CCPA held that claims defining such a special purpose apparatus were
statutory subject matter and had to be examined for patentability in view of
existing prior art.66 After Prater and Bernhart the CCPA had apparently
made it clear that apparatus claims reciting a combination of a digital com-
puter and a computer program were not inherently nonstatutory and were
not to be rejected under the mental steps doctrine. Patentability of such
machines was to be measured against the traditional standards of novelty
6 T
and nonobviousness in view of the prior art. 68
III. Benson AND Johnston: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
In Gottschalk v. Benson,69 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
patentability of computer programs and, specifically, whether such inventions
are a "process" within the meaning of the patent law. The applicants in
Benson presented process claims covering a method of converting binary
coded decimal numbers (BCD) to pure binary numbers. 70 This conversion
is closely aligned with any practical application of a general purpose digital
computer because of the constant need to interface the decimal number sys-
tem used by humans with the binary number system employed internally by
a computer. The invention was embodied as an algorithmic computer pro-
65. 417 F.2d at 1401.
66. Id. at 1399-400. The court responded to a PTO argument that a programmed
digital computer is not a new machine because the apparatus has not changed by stating
that the programmed computer "is physically different from the machine without that
program; its memory elements are differently arranged. The fact that these physical
changes are invisible to the eye should not tempt us to conclude that the machine
has not been changed." Id. at 1400.
67. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
68. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
69. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
70. Claim 8 of the Benson patent application reads:
The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form into binary
which comprises the steps of:
(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a reentrant shift register,
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until there is
a binary '1' in the second position of said register,
(3) masking out said binary '1' in said second position of said register,
(4) adding a binary '1' to the first position of said register,
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
(6) adding a '1' to said first position, and
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in preparation
for a succeeding binary '1' in the second position of said register.
Id. at 73-4.
[Vol. 26:835
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gram or subprogram executed automatically within the computer without any
human intervention. The CCPA had reversed a -PTO 'Board of Appeals'
mental steps rejection and established patentability. 7 1 The court was careful
to note that the particular invention at issue departed significantly from prior
process claims because the process was "directed solely to the art of data-
processing itself whereas in most [others] some subsidiary or additional art
was involved."
72
The Supreme Court reversed the CCPA and found the claims unpatent-
able. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, found the claims imper-
missibly abstract and sweeping in scope since they were without any limita-
tions as to the apparatus for performing the process or the technology or end
use to which the process was to be applied.7 3  The opinion cites prior case
law relating to apparatus claims for noncomputer applications to support the
principle that abstract intellectual concepts are unpatentable unless they are
grounded in some novel and concrete application.7 4  Citing the definition of
a patentable process set forth in Cochrane v. Deener,; n the Court stated that
the sine qua non of patentability of a process claim was the "transformation
and reduction of an article 'to a different state or thing' " and found no such
transformation inherent in the claimed process.7" The Benson invention was
classified as a mathematical formula. Therefore, since it had no practical
application except with a general purpose digital computer and would, if
patented, preempt any use of the mathematical formula by anyone other than
the patentee, it was as unpatentable as any pure algorithm would be.
While ruling that the Benson claim caused no apparent transformation of
an article to a new thing and would have effectively preempted any inde-
pendent application of the process, the Court refrained from holding that no
program claimed as a process could be patented or that the decision was to
be construed as precluding the patenting of any program/computer combina-
tion. 77 The Court apparently considered itself unequipped to formulate such
71. 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
72. Id. at 686.
73. 409 U.S. at 67-68.
74. Id. at 68.
75. 94 U.S. 780 (1877).
76. 409 U.S. at 69-70. The Court apparently felt that the requisite transformation
could not be inferred since it made no attempt to explain why the transforation of
BCD to pure binary does not satisfy the requirement. This is a curious omission, since,
as the CCPA had noted, the mere fact that the transformation occurs internally within
the computer and is not observable by the human eye should not result in a denial
of its occurrence. See note 66 supra.
77. The Court stated: "It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program
servicing a computer. We do not so hold." 409 U.S. at 71. This language when
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a sweeping policy and it called upon Congress to resolve the issue of patent-
ability of computer programs. 78
In a subsequent case, the CCPA construed the Benson holding narrowly,
seeing it as a rejection only of claims to computer implemented algorithms
that are not limited to any specific technology or end use. 79 The Supreme
Court appeared to confirm this interpretation in dicta in Dann v. Johnstons°
by characterizing its Benson holding as limited. The Johnston claims were
ultimately held unpatentable without further discussion of what types of pro-
grams, if any, are statutory subject matter.81
IV. THE Chatfield DECISION
In In re Chatfield8 2 the claimant appealed a PTO Board of Appeals
decision that his claims for a process dynamically reallocating the priorities
of a computer system's processing resources were drawn to a subject matter
deemed nonstatutory in Benson. Chatfield's invention, as characterized by
the CCPA, comprised a "novel solution [which] dynamically evaluates and
considered with other statements in the opinion has aroused controversy as to the actual
scope of the holding in Benson. For a more detailed analysis of the Benson decision
see Sher, Comment: Comm. of Patents v. Benson et al., 56 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 179
(1974); Note, Gottschalk v. Benson: A Bright Light With A Dim Future, 28 BAYLOR
L. REV. 187 (1976).
78. "If these programs are to be patentable, considerable problems are raised which
only committees of Congress can manage, for broad powers of investigation are needed,
including hearings which canvass the wide variety of views which those operating in
this field entertain." 409 U.S. at 73.
79. In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The Christensen applicant
appealed from a Board of Appeals' rejection of his process claims for a computer imple-
mented method of determining the porosity of subsurface formations. The Board had
held Christensen's claims to be nonstatutory because they recited a mathematical form-
ula at the point of novelty and because the method would be commercially embodied
as a computer program. The CCPA, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Benson,
determined that the claims were unpatentable.
80. 425 U.S. 219 (1976). The Court's language adds even more confusion to the
actual scope of the Benson holding:
As we observed [in Benson], [t]he claims were not limited to any particular
art or technology, to any particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particu-
lar end use. Our limited holding . . . was that respondent's method was not
a patentable "process" as that term is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 100(b).
Id. at 224 (emphasis added).
81. The Court noted that both the petitioner and respondent had thoroughly briefed
the issue of patentability of computer programs, but stated that the question need not
be addressed since, in the view of the Court, Johnston's claimed invention was obvious
in view of the prior art and, therefore, unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. 425 U.S.
at 220.
82. 545 F.2d 152 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3181 (U.S. Oct. 4,
1977).
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reassigns program priorities as the programs execute."
'8
3 The claims specifi-
cally defined the invention as a method which comprises steps for accumulat-
ing data pertinent to resource utilization by the system, periodically interrupt-
ing the processing programs to analyze the accumulated data, employing the
results of the analysis to appropriately change priority operations within the
system, resuming execution of the processing programs, and reiteratively
executing the method during computer operation. A dependent claim set
forth an algorithm for analyzing resource utilization.
8 4
Chatfield argued that Benson did not foreclose the patentability of all
method claims defining inventions most advantageously practiced by a com-
puter program, but only such claims as recited abstract and sweeping mathe-
matical formulae unrestricted to any particular technology or end use.
8 5
Chatfield urged that his invention as claimed was limited to computer tech-
nology and was directed to a specific process for improving computer per-
formance.
A majority of the CCPA reversed the Board of Appeals' decision. Benson
was considered not to preclude the patenting of all computer programs; thus
the mere labeling of the process claim as a computer program was not by
itself sufficient to warrant an automatic nonstatutory subject matter rejec-
tion.8 6 The court indicated that since claims define the invention, an ad hoc
review of the subject matter as claimed was required in each case. Proper
grounds for a 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection would be that the claims defined
either purely mental steps or a sweeping mathematical algorithm unrestricted
83. id. at 154. A representative claim on appeal is for:
A method of operating a computing system upon more than one processing
program concurrently for improving total resource utilization . . . comprising
steps for:
(1) accumulating system utilization data for at least one processing program
for at least one resource, said system utilization data comprising resource
activity and/or resource degradation data;
(2) (a) at spaced intervals interrupting the processing programs and analyzing
the system utilization of at least one processing program;
(2) (b) based on this analysis regulating resource access by assigning an in-
dividual resource access priority and/or preventing resource access alto-
gether in an unlike manner to at least two resources for at least one
processing program to increase thruput;
(3) resuming the operation of the computing systems on the processing pro-
grams; and,
(4) continually repeating steps (1) to (3).
Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 155.
86. Id.
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to a particular technology or end use."7 The claims were to be judged in
their entirety, and from this perspective the majority could not find in Chat-
field's claims the objectionable abstractness, the sweeping scope, or the com-
plete preemption of the process which characterized the Benson case. Draw-
ing a fine distinction, the majority held that the process claims were limited
to a particular technology, that is, the control of programs being processed
by a computer, and were, therefore, statutory, unlike Benson's claims which
merely set forth algorithmic operations to be performed to change a number
from one system to another. 88
Judge Rich and Judge Lane dissented in Chatfield, indicating complete dis-
agreement with the majority's narrow construction of the Benson decision. In
Chatfield, Judge Rich expressed his belief that the circumstances and lan-
guage of the Benson decision could give rise to only one conclusion: The
Supreme Court views all programs for general purpose digital computers as
nonstatutory subject matter.89 In concluding his dissent, Judge Rich stated
that the prevailing uncertainty within the computer industry and the PTO
over patenting of computer software must necessarily be resolved by an
authority higher than the CCPA.90
V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF Chatfield
The Supreme Court's opinion in Gottschalk v. Benson9 had served as an
ill-defined but nonetheless seemingly impenetrable barrier to an inventor who
desired patent protection for his computer software invention. One who con-
tributed a novel implementation of computers to the useful arts was denied
protection if he chose to commercially embody his invention as a computer
87. Id. at 157. It is a statutory requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1970) that
patentability be decided on an evaluation of the subject matter as a whole. Since the
claims define the invention, see text accompanying note 42 supra, there is support for
the holding that the claimed combination must be considered as a unit when patentabil-
ity is being determined. In the context of Chatfield's invention the claims recite "a
method of operating a computing system," and thus the invention was limited to a
particular technology and end use.
88. 545 F.2d at 159.
89. Id. at 161. Judge Rich has consistently maintained that Benson precludes the
patenting of process claims Although he expressed disagreement with the Benson hold-
ing in In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1973) by stating that he could
"see no reason why such a specific, useful, technological process as a process for deter-
mining subsurface porosity, concededly a contribution to the useful arts, cannot be de-
fined in the language of mathematics which is widely used as a medium of communica-
tion in that field .... ." id. at 1396, he could find no support in either Benson or
Johnston for limiting the Benson holding.
90. Id.
91. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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program. On the other hand, he could obtain a patent if he chose to imple-
ment his idea entirely by hardware. The Chatfield decision, however, held
that the mere affixing of the label "computer program" to an invention
claimed as either a process or an apparatus does not license the PTO to deny
patentability.9 2 The patent laws provide that the claims define the invention,
and if upon examination of the claims it is found that they define a statutory
invention, the nature of the commercial embodiment cannot defeat patent-
ability.
The majority and dissent recognized that Chatfield is not the final word
on whether computer programs are per se statutory subject matter since only
the Supreme Court or Congress can finally resolve the issue. The decision
does, however, manifest an attempt to develop workable standards vis-A-vis
the Supreme Court's Benson decision. The court acknowledged that its past
Musgrave test, which looked to whether the invention as claimed is within the
technological arts, is no longer the entire consideration. Instead, it suggests
that Benson-like questions should be answered by determining whether the
invention as claimed is a mere algorithm or amounts to a discovery unre-
stricted to any particular end use or field of technology, or is so sweeping
and abstract so as to preclude, if patented, all others from practicing the
invention in yet unanticipated ways. The mental steps doctrine, if it con-
tinues to exist as a ground for rejection, appears to be included within the
more general rule that one may not patent a mere idea.
Both the majority and the minority reject the notion of any inherent ad-
vantage for patentability in those claims denoting a software invention as an
apparatus over those claimed as a process. Since the Supreme Court in
Benson had examined only process claims and found the claims at issue non-
statutory, the argument had been made that the holding was not germane
to apparatus claims. The court found no such distinction since a skilled claim
drafter can often claim the same invention in either form. This holding is
consistent with the court's desire to resolve patentability on the basis of sub-
stance rather than form, as evidenced by its focus on the nature of the inven-
tion as it is defined by the claims to resolve the section 101 issue. Under
Chatfield, the PTO can no longer use the Benson holding to deny patentability
to process claims characterized as computer programs. Instead, claimed
processes implemented within a computer system must be examined in the
92. The court in Chatfield stated: "The unique technological aspects of digital com-
puters and the changes wrought in their operation by associated software programs,
coupled with the limited number of precedential court decisions, illustrate the undesira-
bility of deciding the issue of patentability by mere use of the label 'computer program.'
545 F.2d at 156.
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same manner as any other process.93 The CCPA demonstrated acumen in
science as well as patent law by recognizing a computer implemented process
to be as much within the technological arts as are processes performed by
mechanical or chemical counterparts.
9 4
VI. THE LARGER PERSPECTIVE
The computer and its controlling programs are recognized as important
tools for significant future technological advances. An engineer faced with
a problem to solve will, when appropriate, look to computers and computer
programs to find a solution expeditiously. Until Chatfield, however, his ef-
forts would, in many instances, be unprotected and unrewarded by the patent
system. It is agreed that when the engineer "builds" his programs by inter-
connecting in a logical sequence basic computer instructions, his final product
is less tangible and probably more difficult to comprehend than a machine
assembled by his mechanical counterpart. The engineer's software invention,
however, operates under the same physical laws and obtains tangible results
and transformations within the computer. The Chatfield invention exempli-
fies an area of technology rapidly advancing as hardware and software tech-
niques become more sophisticated. It demonstrates the utilization of the
processing power and flexibility of a programmed computer in an ever in-
creasing number of applications and foreshadows the discovery of highly com-
plex methods employed wholly within a computer to improve its efficiency.
The Chatfield decision by legitimizing the patentability of a process which
controls the internal functions of a computer will foster the use of computers
in inventive and beneficial ways. It demonstrates that the patent laws as
currently stated and judicially interpreted, view patentability determinations
for such computer software applications as similar to determinations involving
conventional mechanical methods and apparatus.
The grant of a patent monopoly is a significant act since it enables the
patentee to exclude his invention from the public domain for a limited term.
There are certain types of inventions which are not proper subject matter for
a patent. One should not, for example, be permitted to monopolize a natur-
ally occurring phenomenon, a mere algorithm, or a method of doing business.
Inventions such as these have long been considered as within the public
domain. When, however, a program implements an inventive process or con-
93. Id. at 157.
94. A unanimous CCPA confirmed this characterization of computer technology
in a decision subsequent to Chatfield. See In re Deutsch, 553 F.2d 689 (C.C.P.A.
1977) (process claims which contemplate the incidental use of computer programs are
statutory subject matter).
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trols a computer within an inventive apparatus and when such a process or
apparatus is applied to a useful field of technology, then the invention en-
compassing the process or apparatus should be and, as recognized by the
CCPA, is patentable.
It has been said that the purpose of the patent system is not to reward
individual inventors but to promote the general welfare by increasing the
technological information available to the public at large by requiring disclo-
sure of inventions. Public disclosure is strictly forbidden under trade secret
law and only when it is the sole means to provide incentive to the inventor
to continue his work will the public benefit by this form of intellectual prop-
erty protection. Copyrights do provide for publication of the work and pro-
tect its form as published. The limited scope of copyright protection is often
inadequate for protecting the theory which underlies the invention. Patents,
however, do provide widespread technology dissemination and, at the same
time, for comprehensive protection of the invention, its owner. If computers
and computer programs will be in the vanguard of future technological
progress, then patents are an appropriate vehicle to foster public access to
such progress and to stimulate further invention. The CCPA in Chatfield
indicated that the patent system can and should play a significant role in the
continuing advancement of computer technology and, more importantly, the
court recognized that the time has come for the law to advance the state of
its own art to be commensurate with its engineering counterpart.
Robert J. Gaybrick
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